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[Crim. No. GGl7.

In Bank.

Aug. 23, 1960.]

'fHE PEOPLE, Rl'spondt'llt, v. JEWEI1L ASHBY GOULD
C't a1., Appellants.
[11 Burglary-Evidence.-Thou;;h the prosecuting witness' identification of 0111' of two del'endants as the Ulan she saw in her
npartment was inconelu,<ive, where her testimony adequately
established that a burglary was committed, such defendant's
admissions after his arrest that he took "a few dollars" from
the location and that he didll't recall whether he "shimmed
the door or the door was legally unlocked" eould be used to
identify him as one of the burglars and sustained the jury's
finding that he participated in the crime.
[2] Id.-Evidence.-Though the prosceuting witness' testimony ill
a burglary case that defendant had "some features but not nil
of the features" of the burglar she saw inside her apartment
did not amount to an identification, evidence of her extrajudicial identification of his photograph shortly after the crime
was admissible.
[3] Crimina.l La.w - Evidence - Identity. - Evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an
identification made at the trial, but 8S independent evidence
of identity.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-Evidellce of an extrajudicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial
[3] Extrajudicial identification of defendant in criminal case,
note, 70 A.L.R. 1)10. See also Cal.Jut.2d, Evidence, § 179; Am.Jut.,
Evidence, § 350.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Burglary, § 29; [2] Burglary, § 24:
(3-5] Criminal Law, § 314; (6] Crilllinal Law, § 287; (7] Crilllinlll
Law, § 264; [H, DJ Cl'illlinal Law, § 1285; [10] Criminal Law, § 328:
[11, 13] Criminal Law, ~ 4-1:1; [)2, H. l,jl Criminal Law, § 89.J;
[16] Criminal Law, ~ :IS9(:1): [17-19] ('l'illlinni Law, § 1)65(1).
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identification is illlp('a~hl'd, IH''';;Hse the carli!'r identi1ication
!tas gTP:lt<'r pl'obntin~ value thnn :1n i.il'ntilicatioll maue in the
eourtl'OOl1l arter the slIggestiolls of others and the eirculllstances of the trial Illay haw il:tl'l'VC'ned to create a fancietl
recognition in the wit lles~' min.!.
[5] Id. - Evidence - Identity. - A witness' failure to repeat an
extrajllllicial it!('ntifieation in cOllrt does not destroy its probative value, since snch fniil1l'e lIIay be explaineu by loss of
memory or other cirCUllIstnnccs. The ('xtrajudicial identification tends to COIllH'ct defendnnt with the crillle, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay Hidenl!e is not present since
the witness is tn-aibhle at the trial for cross-exalllination.
[6] Id.-Rebuttal Evidence.-'Where testimony e1icitcd by defense
counsel on cross-cxalllination ill a burglary casc gave rise to an
inference that defen!lant's wife alltl her son Wl!re improperly
detainell for the purpose of int1ucil'.:; t1rfend:lllt to confess, the
prosecution was entitled to rebut this inference by eliciting
a diflerent explanation for their arre~t.
[7] Id.-Mistrial.-AssUllling that testimony of an officer in n burglary case that after thl! arrest he found in defendant's home
"numerous fur picces," which the prosecution elicited to rebut
the inference e:,tablished by defense coullsel that defendant's
wife and her SOll were improperly detained for the purpose of
inducing defendant to confess, was struck on defendant's
motion because the trial court found that its prejudicial effect
exceeded its prohati\"(' value, it did not follow that a mistrial
should have berll declarea where the refl'rellce to "fur pieces"
was hrief and vague in its illlplications, it was struck immediately, the jury was admonisheu to disregaru it, anu further
argument on the point took place out of the jury's hearing.
[8] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury-Following Instructions.It must be nssumed that onlinarily adlllonitions to the jury
are heeded.
[9] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury-Following Instructions.A trial court's decision that an error or impropriety can be
cured by admonition will not be re,ersed unless exceptional
circumstances make it illlprohable that the jury obeyed the
admonition.
[10] Id.-Conduct of Judge.-Ruling,., of the trial court in granting
a mistrial in a prior trial of a burglary case with regard to
the sallle tcstilllony admitted in the present trial but struck
imlllediately were not inconsistent, and the pro~('cution was not
guilty of wilful mi<;conduct in reintroducing testimony previously held inalllllissible, where the t('stilllony was al'guabl~'
adlllissihie at the second trial to 1'I'but an inference of 11\1propriety raised hy defense coullsrl, wItC're tlte record of tbe
fir!:'t trial was lIot Lefore the l'e\·iewin;; c0urt, :1Ilt! where the
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trial jud~e stated that the two situations were not "in the
same cate;:rory" and did not have "the sallie srriou~ness."
[111 Id.-Evidence-Admissions.-Where the prosecutill~ witness'
idt>ntiUcation of dcft'lHlallt as the burglar who was in;:ide her
apartment wa~ equivocal so as to make proof of h~s c'onnl'l'tion
with the crillle d<'peuu on testimony as to his extrajudicial
admission!:, the latter te:itimony was direct evid<'lll'e that the
admissions were made but indirect evidence of the truth of
what was admitted. (Code Ci'f'. Proc.. , § 1832.)
(12) ld.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-The standard
instructions on circmilstantial evidenee (namelr, that such
cvidence Illu::;t be consistent with thc hypothe5is of defendant's
guilt and ilTecolicilablc with any other rational conclusion)
clnrify applieation of the general doctrine r<'quiring proof
beyond a re:150nable doubt to a case in which defendnnt's guilt
must be infcrred frol11 a pattern of incriminating eircumstances. They dl'al with proof of each fact which is essential
to complete a chain of circulllstances that will establish defendant's guilt, the me of evidence susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, nnd the relationship required
between the proved circumstances and possible hypotheses;
they should not he ginn when the problem of inferring guilt
from a pattern of incriminating circuJllstances is not pl·esent.
[13] ld.-Evidence-Admissions.-Testimony as to an extrajudicial
admission is indirect evidence of the matter admitted heenuse
the jurors are called on not only to believe what is said in
court-thnt the admission was made-but to infer that the
admission was true j such testimony is indirect evidence only
because it is hearsay.
[14] Id.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-The standard
instructions on circumstantial evidence do not refer to the
problem of cYnluating hearsay; they are unnecessary and may
be misleading when the jury is to consider only whether a
judicial admission was made and, if made, whether it wns tnlE'.
[15] ld.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-The ~tandard
instructions on circumstantial evidence arc not applicuble to
evidcnce of extrajudicial admissions. (Disapproving statements or implications to the eontrary in People Y. KnClIirf,
20 C'n1.2d 87, 173 P.2d 1, and Pao1llc V. CllIuliottn, 128 Cal.
App.2d 347, 275 P.2d 500.)
[16] ld. - Evidence - Facts Showing Oonsciousness of Guilt.Statcl'aents of fact by defendant that were incredibl!', Inter
proyed false or cOlltradicted by his suhsequent t!'stilliony may
give rise to an inference of attempted cOll(,!'allllellt nntl COIlsciousness of g'uilt, hut >;1\ch inferell('e could not be dl'aWll
[12] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Trill!, § 485; Am.Jur., 'rriul, § 77"2.
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where defell(lallt. when ai<ked on arrest where he had l.Jeeu 011
the day of the erillH', alll't,!"e(lly rl'plied, "I <1on't know, but l.Jy
the time I get to court I will ha\'e four or flve people to place
me where I want to be."
[17] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-An extrajudicial idcntification that
cannot be confirm cd by an idl'ntifieation at the trial is insuffieient to sustain a convietion in the ahscnee of othl'r evidence
tending to connect defendant with the crime.
[18] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-The probative value of an iden,
tification depends on the circumstances under which it was
made. \Vhere the prosecuting witness in a burglary case merely
selected one of a slUall group of photographs as similar to the
man she saw on the stcps outside her burglarized apartment,
the small size of the group increased the danger of suggestion.
[19] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-Identification from a still photograph is l>ubstantially less reliable than identification of an
individual seen in person; it becomes particularly suspect when
the witness fails to identify the subject of the photograph
when seen in person and there is no other evidence tending to
identify him.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Herbert V. Walker, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second
degree burglary affirmed as to defendant Gould; reversed as
to defendant Marudas.
George Stahlman, Earle K. Stanton, Max Solomon, John J.
Bradley, Palmer & Long and Dermot R. Long for Appellants.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Ernest E. Sanchez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendants Jcwell Ashby
Gould and Andrew Peter Marudas guilty of burglary in the
second degree. Each defendant appeals from the judgment
of conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new trial.
At the trial Mrs. :r.larguerite Fenwick testified that at noon
on August 26, 1958, she left her apartment Oll Shoreham
Drive and went to the swimming pool. ,'lltt'n site returned
about six minutes later for suntan oil, she saw a man stamling
on the steps outside her door and fonnd th(' door slig-htly ajar.
She Raw a second man in her apartm(,llt who shouted: "Go
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into the brLlroom and stay tl1p1'e." She walked towards the
bedroom auu heard the front door close behind her. Looking
out the window she saw the same two men running away. She
subsequently noticed some coins on the floor and discovered
that about $15 was missing from her purse.
About 1 p. m. Officer Brewer arrived and showed Mrs.
Fellwick sewn to ten slllall photographs. She selected twoone of l\Iarudas as the man on the steps and one of Gould as
the man inside her apartment. On several subsequent occasions
she identified the same two photographs or enlargements
thereof.
Officer Cataldi testified that when arrested Gould at first
denied knowledge of any burglary on Shoreham Drive. On
being told that an eyewitness had identified him Gould said:
"I know what you are talking about." He admitted taking
"a few dollars" from the location and stated: "I don't recall
whether I shimmed the door or the door was legally unlocked."
\Vhen asked about his accomplice he said: "Why don't you
check Pete? ... Pete Lombardi." Marudas at all times denied
having any knowleuge of the burglary.
At the trial Mrs. Fenwick pointed out Gould as having
"some features but not all of the features" of the man she
saw inside her apartment, and added that he seemed thinner
than the burglar. She stated that she was unable to point out
anyone in the courtroom as the man she saw on the steps.
She also said that the pictures she selected shortly aft.er the
crime "looked similar to the men who were in my apartment
but not all the features were the same." Officer Brewer testified on cross-examination, however, that Mrs. Fenwick was
sure of her identifications of the photographs at the time she
first selected them.
GOULD '8 ApPEAL

[ 1 ] Gould contends that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the verdict in that he was not adequately identified as
the man Mrs. Fenwick saw in her apartment. It is true that
Mrs. Fenwick's identification of Gould was inconclusive. Her
testimony, however, adequately established that a burglary
had been committed. Gould's admissiolls after his arrest could
therefore be used to identify him as olle of the burg-lars (People
v. Amaya, 40 Ca1.2d 70, 75-76 [251 P.2U 324]; People v.
Mehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535, 544-545 [197 P.2d 12]; People v.
Griffin, DB Cal.App.2d 1. 46-47 [219 P.2d 519]). and sustain
the jury's finding that he participated in the crime.
Gould ('ol1tel1(ls that the trial court erred in admitting evi-

G26
deuce that Mrs. Fenwick identified his photograph shotlly
after the crime. He asserts that Mrs. Fenwick did not identify
him at the trial and that cviuence of an extrajudicial identification is admissible only to corroborate an identification made
at the trial by the same witness.
[2] Mrs. li'cllwick testified that Gould had "some features but not all of the features" of the burglar. She statcd
that "the man who was in my apartnll'llt seemed to havehe was a heavy man; he had rather fat cheeks and this man
is very thin." Gould testified that nfter his arrcst he became
"very ill" and that he had" hernia trouble," but he denied
that he had lost weight. Mrs. Fenwick also testified that
". . . it is awfully hard for me to point to someone after all
of this time, saying that that is the person who looks like that
person because my memory is rather vague about it now."
Although her testimony did not amount to an identification,
the evidence of her extrajudicial identification was nevertheless
admissible.
[3] Evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an idcntifi.!ation made at the
trial (People v. Slobodion, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 560 (191 P.2d 1]),
but as independent evidence of identity. [4] Unlike other
testimony that caunot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached (People v. JIa,.denbrook,48 Ca1.2d 345, 351 [309 P.2d 424] ; People v. Kynettc,
15 Ca1.2d 731, 753-754 [104 P.2d 794]), evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the
testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier
identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestion!'! of others
and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to
create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. (People v.
Slobodioll, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 559-560 [191 P.2d 1] ; U'lliied States
v. Forzallo, 190 F.2d 687, 689; see People v. Hood, 140 Cal.
App.2d 585, 588 [295 P.2d 525] ; Peop7e v. Be1lnett, 11!J Cal.
App.2d 224, 226 [259 P.2d 476] ; 4 Wigmore, Evidenc!' (3d
ed. 1940), § 1130, p. 208.) [5] The failure of the witness
to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not
Ilestroy its probative value, for snch failurc may be explained
hy loss of memory or other circumstances. The extrajudieial
identification tends to conm'ct the defendant with the crime,
and the principal danger of admitting hearsay e.... idence is
not present since the witness is available at the trial for ('rOS8I'xamination. (See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 1i4-17!i [146
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A.2d :29, :12-;33 J ; McCormick, Evidence, § 39, p. 74; Morgan,
Ilwnw!J Dallgers, 62 narv.L.Hev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wigmore,
Evidcnce (3d cd. 1940), § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State
v. Wil"vll, 38 \Vll.2d 593, 617-618 [231 P.2d 288, 300-301] ;
People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202 [101 N.E.2d 457,
460-461]. )
Gould contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dcclare a mistrial. Officer Cataldi testified that he
and other officers arrested Gould at his home on September
5, 1938, at approximately 10 p. m. On cross-examination defense counsel brought out that Gould's wife and her 14-yearold son were taken into custody at the same time, that they
were not released until 5 a. m. the next morning, and that no
charges were filed against them. By his questions counsel
suggested that Gould was aware of their detention and was
disturbed by it during the period in which he allegedly admitted committing the burglary. On redirect examination the
assistant district attorney asked if there was any reason for
arresting Gould's wife and her son. Over defendant's objection the officer replied that a search of Gould's home following
his arrest revealed "numerous fur pieces." Defendant's
motion to strike this answer was granted and the jury was
admonished to disregard the answer and any inference to be
drawn therefrom. Defendant then moved to declare a mistrial, contending that the prejudicial effect of the officer's
testimony could not be cured by a mere admonition.
[6] The testimony elicited by defense counsel on crossexamination gave rise to an inference that Gould's wife and
her son were improperly detained for the purpose of inducing
Gould to confess. 1 The prosecution was entitled to rebut this
inference by eliciting a different explanation for their arrrst.
[7] 'Ye assume that the proffered evidence was struck because the trial court found that its prejudicial effect exceeded
its probative value. Even on this assumption, however, it does
not follow that a mistrial should have been declared. The
reference to "fur pieces" was brief and vague in its implications; it was struck immediately; the jury was admonished
to disrrgard it; and further ar:,rument on thr point took place
out of the jury's hearing. [8] It mnst be assumed that
ordinarily admonitions to the jury are heeded. (People Y.
Fnotr" 48 Ca1.2d 20, 23 [306 P.2d 8031 ; P('oz>le v. Tarantino,
45 Ca1.2d fi90, 597-598 [290 P.2d 50!)] ; P('ople v. Dabb. 32
'On this appeal, however, Gould does not contend that his admissions
in\·o]unt::ry.
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Ca1.2d 491, 499 [197 P .2d 11.) [ 9 ] •\ ll'ietl l'ollrt's llceisioJl
that an crror or illl}>l'Opl'il'ty l'all he ("lll'l'd by admonition will
not be reversed ulIies,; l'Xt:I'ptional l'il'Clllllstalwl's make it il11probablc that the jul'Y obeyed the lllltnonitioll. (Sec People\'.
Foote, 48 Ca1.2d 20, 24 [306 1'.2d 803] ; People v. Zamillora,
66 Cal.App.2d 166, 212 [152 P.2d 180J.) No such circumstances appear ill thc prescnt rase.
[10] Gould asserts that two days bcforc giving the testimony as to fur picces Offieer Cataldi gave similar testimony
and that the same trial judge at that time granted defendants'
motion to declare a mistrial. Gould contends that the trial
court's rulings were inconsistent and that the prosecution
committed wilful misconduct ill reintroducing' tt'Btimony previously held inadmissible. At the second trial, however, the
testimony was arguably admissible to rebut the inference of
impropriety raised by defcnse l'Ollllsel. The reeord of the first
trial is not before us and we are not aware of the circulllstanees
preceding the earlier ruling. The trial judge stated that th('
two situations were not" in the same category" and did nor
have "the same seriousness." Accordingly, no inconsistcnc~
or wilful misconduct appears.
Gould contends that his identification as one of the burglars depended chiefly on circumstantial evidence and that
the trial court therefore erred in refusing to give certain
standard instructions on circumstantial evidence. 2 [11] Since
Mrs. Fenwick's identification of Gould was equivocal, proof
of his connection with the crime depended on testimony as to
his extrajudicial admissions. Such testimony is direct evidence
that the admissions were made but: indirect evidence of the
truth of what was admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1832; People
"The following instructions ,vere rcquested by Gould and \'efused by
the trial court:
"If the. evidence in this case [as to any particular count] is susceptible
of two constructions or interpretations, each of which appeors to you
to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant,
nnd the other to his innocence, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt
that interpretation which will admit of def~ndllnt 's innotence, and reject
that which points to his guilt,
"You will notice that this rule applies' only when l)oth of the two
possible opposing conclusions appear to YOll to be r('asonahle. If. on th,'
other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to he
rcasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to
ndhere to the rt'llsonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, Lcar·
ing in mind, however, that even if the reasonable de,luction points to
defendant's guilt, the entire proof must e~rry the convincing force reo
quired by law to support a verdict of guilt. :
"1 instruct you further that you are nol Pt'flllittl'll, on ('irtllm~tulltial
c\'idcnce alone, or when circumstantial evial'lIce i~ ~u\'stalllially relied 011
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v. ](oclIig, 29 Ca1.2d 87, 91 [li3 P.2d 1J.) We have concluded,
for reasons that appear below, that the requested instructions
do not apply to all types of indirect evidence and that they
were properly refused in the present case.
[12] The requested instructions clarify the application
of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to a case in which the defcndant's guilt must be inferred
from a pattern of incriminating circulllstances. (See People v.
Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [150 P.2d 812J; People v.
Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 154-155 [146 P.2d 469].) They
deal with proof of "each fact which is essential to complete
a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant's
guilt, " the use of evidence" susceptible of two constructions or
interpretations," and the relationship required between" the
proved circumstances" and possible hypotheses. Such instructions should not be giYen when the problem of inferring guilt
from a pattern of incriminating circumstances is not present.
[13] Testimony as to an extrajudicial admission is indirect
evidence of the matter admitted because the jurors are called
upon not only to believe what is said in court-':"'that the admission was made--but to infer that the admission was true.
(People v. Koenig, 29 Ca1.2d 87, 91 [173 P.2d 1].) Thus such
testimony is indirect evidence only because it is hearsay.
[14] The requested instructions on circumstantial evidence
clearly do not refer to the problem of evaluating hearsay. They
are unnecessary, and may be misleading, when the jury is to
consider only whether the admission was made, and if made,
whether it was true. (People v. Bretagna, 298 N.Y. 323, 326
[83 N.E.2d 537, 538] ; see Morgan, Adllll:ssions and the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L.J. 355, 356-358.)
[15] Other jurisdictions agree, though on somewhat different grounds, that the standard instructions on circumstantial evidence are not applicable to evidence of extrajudicial
admissions. (Annot., 40 A.L.R. 571; 22 C.J.S., § 530, p. 839,
§ 816 subsec. a., p. 1422 and Supp. 1960,p. 313; 1 Underhill,
in the People's case, to find the defendant guilty of rthe] [any] erime
charged against him unless the pro\'cd circumstances not only are consistent with the hypothesis that thc defendant is guilty of the crime, but
are irreconcilahle with any other rational conclusion.
"\Vhen the case which has hecn made out hy the Pcople against a
defendant re,ts entirely or chiefly on cireumstantial evidence, and in any
case before the jury may fin<1 a defendant guilty basing its fiuding solely
on such evidence. earh fact which is t'sRential to complete a chain of
circuDl~tances that will e~tablish the defendant's guilt must he proved
Leyond a reasona LIe dou Lt. "
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Criminal Evidence (5th ed. 1956), § 19, p. 27.) Research has
failed to reveal any case from another jurisdiction holding
otherwise, except Damas v. People, 62 Colo. 418 [163 P. 289,
L.R.A. 1917D 591], which was expressly <lverruled in Mitchell
v. People, 76 Colo. 346 [232 P. 685, 40 A.L.R. 566].
In People v. Koenig, 29 Ca1.2d 87 [173 P.2d 1], we noted
tbat section 1832 of the Code of Civil Procedure cites testimony as to an ex.trajudicial admission as an example of
"indirect evidence" and we concluded that the refusal to give
a requested instruction on circumstantial evidence was erroneous. In that case, however, the prosecution relied heavily on
proof of incriminating circumstances other than the defcndant's alleged admissions. The requested instruction on circumstantial evidence was appropriate there without regard
to the testimony 8." to admissions, since the jury might have
believed the defendant's denial that he made the admissions
and yet have iuferred his guilt from the other incriminating
circumstances alone. (People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144,
153 [146 P.2d 469] ; see People v. Zerillo, 36 Ca1.2d 222, 233
[223 P.2d 223] ; People v. Sz:meone, 26 Ca1.2d 795, 807 [161
P .2d 369].) Since the statutory definition of "indirect evidence" includes both hearsay and presumptions (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1957-1963), to which the requested instructions on
cireumstantial evidence obviously do not apply, it could not
have been its purpose to affect the giving of those instructions.
Any statements or implications to the contrary in People v.
Koenig, supra, and People v. Candiotto, 128 Cal.App.2d 347
[275 P.2d 500], are disapproved.
Gould's contentions are without merit and his conviction
must be affirmed.
M:ARUDAS' ApPEAL

Marudas contends that the evidence tending to identify
him as the man Mrs. Fenwick saw on the steps outside her
apartment was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Mrs.
Fenwick testified that she ~ras unable to point out anyone
in the courtroom as the man she saw 011 the steps. Gould did
not identify Marudas as his accomplice, but suggested that
the police check one" Pete I.lombardi." Unlike Gonld. Marudas
at all times denied having any knowledge of the burglary.
The People contend, however, that Marudas' conviction should
be sustained on the basis of an allegedly evasive statement
made by him at the time of his arrest and Mrs. Fenwick's
extrajudicial identification of his photograph.
[16] When asked upon arrest where he had heen on the
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day of the cri!ll~, ~Ianltlas alleg,'dly replicll: "1 dOIl't know,
but by the time 1 get to court 1 will havc four or five people
to place me where 1 want to be." 'fhe People contend that this '
auswer was so evasive and equivocal that the jury could
properly infer consciousness or guilt. The cases citell by the
People, howcver, im'o!yed statements of fact that were illcr('dible, later proYed false, or contradicted by the tlefendant 's
subsequent testimony. (People v. lV'i,~sc1ifcld, 36 Ca1.2<l 758.
761-763 [227 P.2d 833] ; People v. Oole, HI Cal. 88, 89·90
l74 P. :,}47]; People v. Turner, 86 Cal.App.2d 791, SOO·801
[195 P.2d SOH].) Such statements give rise to inferences of
attempted cOll(;ealmcnt and consciousness of guilt. No comparable falsification or evasion was shown in the present ('ase
and cou,;L"iollS!leSS of guilt could 110t reasonably be inferred.
The ouly evidence tending to eonncct Marullas with the burglary, therefore, was the evidence of Mrs. Fenwick's extra·
judicial identification of his photograph.
[17] An extrajudidal identification that cannot be con.
firmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to
conllect the defendant with the crime. (Sec Reamer v. United
State.~, 229 F.2d 884, 886.)
[18] Moreover, the probative
value of an idpntification depends on the circumstances under
which it was made. Mrs. Fenwick merely selected one of a
small group of photographs. TIle small size of the group in·
creased the danger of suggestion. (See 3 Wigmore, Evidence
(3d ed. 1940), § 786a, p. 164.) [19] Identification from a
still photograph is substantially less reliable than identification
of an individual seen in person. (See id., pp. 165-166.) It
becom!'s particularly suspect when, as in the present case, the
witness subsequcntly fails to identify tbe subject of the photograph \\"11f:n secn in person and th('re is no other evidence
tcnding' to idelltify him.
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed
as to defendant .J ewell Ashby Gould and revcrsed as to defendant Andrew Peter Marudas.
Gibson. C. .T., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J.,
Dooling, J., and Coughlin, J. pro tern.,· concnrred.
Respomlent's petition for a rclH~aring was deni('d September
20, 1960. Conghlin, .T. pro tern.,· partit'ipated therein in place
of Whitt', .J .
• A~siKlll'!l 1Iy Chairman of Judieifll Council.
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